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THE COMMERCE POWER: AN INSTRUMENT OF FEDERALISM
ALBERT S. ABEL*
It may seem strange to think of a purely commercial power as
one of the foundations of democratic institutions. But in my
judgmeht this is just what the commerce clause has turned out to
be. It is inherently a federal device.-A Declaration of Legal Faith.
A consistent conception of the Constitution in integral relationship with
other legal, social, and political phenomena, a long span of years to expound
that conception, and the possession of high intellectual powers, have twice in
our history combined to produce majestic constructions, in the constitutional
universes of Marshall and Holmes. Briefer terms of judicial service perforce
prevent the full exposition, perhaps the full development, of any such im-
pressive fabric, leaving at best sketches and fragments of the grand design.
Even they, however, have sufficed some few great judges to shape enduringly
the course of constitutional thinking. Thus, the Cooley case" is a monument
to Curtis and the Palko case2 to Cardozo. With a length of judicial service
almost identical with Curtis and Cardozo, 3 Rutledge accomplished certainly
no less than they. Leaving to other writers in this symposium the task of ap-
praising his constitutional contributions in areas other than the commerce
clause, I venture to believe that, if his commerce clause insights were his sole
claim to remembrance, they still would entitle him to a very high rank among
American judges. What those insights were and how they support that
belief, this article will undertake to show.
Rutledge's opinions--for the court, concurring, and dissenting-are
naturally the best evidence of his understanding of the clause.' No doubt
significance attaches also to judicial votes; but, like denials of certiorari,5 they
are equivocal guides to elusive conclusions. They may possibly indicate an
unreserved adoption of every nuance of the opinion in which one joins; more
often judicial votes denote a general agreement with the opinion as a rough
approximation to correctness considering it accurate enough that-under
current pressures of time, the corporate impulses of court or minority, and
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University; B.A. 1927, J.D. 1930, State Uni-
versity of Iowa; LL.M. 1937, S.J.D. 1943, Harvard University. Senior attorney OPA,
Washington, D. C. 1942.
1. Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 298 (U. S. 1851).
2. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
3. Curtis served from 1851 to 1857, Cardozo from 1932 to 1938. DOWLING, C\ss ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, app. 1 (3d ed. 1946). Rutledge served from 1943 to 1949.
4. Only once, and then peripherally, did a situation with commerce clause ramifica-
tions claim his attention when he was on the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. See Panitz v. District of Columbia, 172 F.2d 61 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
5. For a recent full discussion of the sterility of denials of certiorari in the generation
of inferences as to judicial views, see the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland
v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 70 S. Ct. 252 (U. S. 1950).
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the relative importance of the question involved as compared with others up
for consideration - the marginal utility of a separate opinion is not deemed
equal to the judicial cost involved. Joinder expressly "in the result" is some-
what more informative since it shows substantial disagreement with substantial
parts of the reasoning; but even it serves rather to raise a question than to give
an answer. Accordingly, exploration of his judicial activity will be addressed
largely to his opinions; and reference to his votes, while not rigidly eschewed,
will be made most sparingly unless he elsewhere shed retrospective light on
their meaning. In addition to his judicial opinions, there is, of course, the
series of lectures published in 1947 in book form under the title, A Declara-
tion of Legal Faith.' (Parenthetically, his choice of the commerce power
as the subject for a lecture series, especially a series with such a title, may
be suggestive of his notions of its relative interest and importance in our
constitutional scheme.) 7  This slender volume is not a mere paraphrase of
his judicial utterances but supplements them as to matters upon which he
had or took no occasion to express himself judicially.
I
We turn first to the National Affirmation-'The Congress shall
have Power . . . to regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States . . .'. In this, as compared with the negative implications
operative upon the states, the solutions have been relatively easy.
There has been concern with what is commerce, not so miuch with
what is regulation . . . Largely the task has been done judicially
of defining the reach of the federal legislative arm."
The substantial scope of Congressional power under our Constitution
with judicial review as its basic regulator is not settled by the permissive or
prohibitory phrases which the Court formulates to define it. judicial elabora-
tion of what Congress has done is as pertinent as judicial declarations of
what it may do. Analytically, of course, the former is not a part of the celestial
mechanics of constitutional law at all but is only the dusty, earthy process of
statutory construction. But, just as the eater's concern is with the proof of
the pudding and not of the recipe, so the citizen's is with the substance of
governmental command rather than with the propositions which sustain or
defeat it. Interpretation and application of statutes passed in reliance on the
commerce clause have been increasingly and, in all likelihood, will be almost
exclusively the context in which the commerce clause in its federal aspect is
presented for consideration. Whether constitutional law as a discipline con-
tinues to exclude such matters or is extended by analogy to embrace them is
6. RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAI T (1947).
7. ". . . the commerce clause is a uniquely federal instrument. More than any
other provision it has had to do with clashes of federal and state power, the lines of
their division and their reconciliation in the federal plan." Id. at 33.
S. Id. at 38-39.
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not very important. But the judicial approach to such problems does condition
and control in fact the extent of power which Congress effectively possesses.
For any individual Justice, the roots of Congressional power over commerce
may be his constitutional conceptions but the fruits are the applications ac-
corded to exercises of the power. Both must be examined to know his
views of the living organism.
Congressional statutes passed under the commerce clause were not, for
Rutledge, conveyancers' instruments to be scanned with a jealous eye and given
a niggardly application. In case after case, with statutes and issues the most
various, he went on record as favoring that one of the alternative construc-
tions which gave the more extended operation to what Congress had tried to
do and had done ;' and, on occasion, he categorically supported that approach. 0
In the same spirit, his impulse was in general to support the substantive in-
terpretations and the procedural techniques established by the administrative
officials or agencies to whom power was delegated Under such statutes." Yet
he recognized a retained power and duty in the Court of examining the record
to see whether the administrative determination was supported by the facts
there appearing and, if not so supported, of setting the determination aside.1
2
9. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163 (1949) (FELA, not confined to injuries inflicted
by accidental means but extended to silicosis) ; United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689,
698 (1948) (concurring opinion, Pure Food, Drugs, and Cosmetic Act, retail resale after
interstate movement ended) ; United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218, 234 (1947)
(noting concurrence in portions of opinion holding conduct subject to Sherman Act and
dissent from portion of opinion holding local taxicab operation in Chicago not to be) ;
United States v. Silk, 331 U. S. 704, 719 (1947) (concurring opinion, Social Security
Act coverage) ; Levinson v. Spector Motor Co., 330 U. S. 649, 685 (1947) (dissenting
opinion, FLSA coverage) ; United States v. Sheridan, 329 U. S. 379 (1946) (National
Stolen Property Act) ; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386, 438 (1945)
(partially dissenting opinion, Sherman Act) ; NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322
U. S. 111 (1944) (NLRA, coverage) ; Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R.,
320 U. S. 336 (1943) (Interstate Commerce Act, waiver of statute of limitations by
agreement) ; Owens v. Union Pacific R. R., 319 U. S. 715 (1943) (assumption of risk
as defense under amended FELA) ; Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 703
(1943) (Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, relevance and sufficiency of evidence).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Silk, 331 U. S. 704, 721 (1947).
11. SEC v. Central-Illinois Securities Corp., 338 U. S. 96 (1949) ; United States v.
Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U. S. 515 (1946) ; Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.
v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 (1946) ; United States v. New York Telephone Co., 326 U. S.
638 (1946) ; May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U. S. 376, 393 (1945) (concurring
in part) ; Barrett Line, Inc. v. United States, 326 U. S. 179 (1945) ; Inland Empire
District Council v. Millis, 325 U. S. 687 (1945) ; Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U. S.
244 (1945); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products Co., 322 U. S. 607, 625 (1944)
(dissenting opinion); McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67 (1944);
cf. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U. S. 217 (1949) (noting partial concur-
rence but voting to enforce NLRB order without modification made by majority.);
United States v. American Union Transport, Inc., 327 U. S. 416 (1946) (foreign com-
merce).
12. May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U. S. 376, 393 (1945) (concurring
opinion); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 678, 688 (1944) (dissenting
opinion); Eastern-Central Motor Carriers' Ass'n v. United States, 321 U. S. 194 (1943) ;
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As manifestations of his attitude toward administrative action, these deci-
sions are considered elsewhere; as manifestations of a judicial response to the
system of controls over interstate commerce deemed appropriate by Congress,
they are noted here. Formulae of statutory construction were not of com-
pelling force. Neither in the common law connotations of words and phrases
used,'3 nor in their literal meaning,'1 4 nor yet in the Court's own prior inter-
pretations (alone or buttressed by statements about the silence of Congress)' 5
did he find ready-made solutions for the problems involved in determining
how far the reach of particular enactments went.
Instead, his principal criterion, alluded to recurrently in his opinions,",
was the purpose which the statute was meant to promote. Reference to the
intention of the legislature is of course a commonplace of judicial discourse-
sometimes as a polite verbal bow, analogous to references in another context
to the testator's intent and equally unrelated to any genuine interest in genuine
desire; sometimes as a handy device for selectively rummaging through the
ambiguities of legislative history. But this "legislative intention" was not all
that was contemplated by insistence on seeking the statute's purposes. Nor
does the doctrine of Heydon's Case,'7 with its focus on the mischief and defect
in the prior law and the legislative remedy provided together with the reason
therefor, fully comprehend the notion of the statutory purpose as conceived
in this connection. Rutledge thought in more positive terms. As he saw it,
Congress, acting under the commerce clause, was neither engaged in doing
literary exercises for the Court to parse nor in fitting secondary patches to
an existing primary fabric. It was prescribing programs of government con-
trol for the achievement of social, economic, or industrial ends appreciably re-
lated to interstate commerce. The Court's job was to treat the statute as a blue-
cf. United States v. Seatrain Lines, 329 U. S. 424, 433 (1947) (noting concurrence "in
the result") ; see United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U. S. 515, 536
(1946).
13. United States v. Silk, 331 U. S. 704, 719 (1947) (concurring, rejecting common
law "control" test of employer-employee relationship for purposes of Social Security
Act); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 122-124 (1944) (stressing
diversity of state common law rules as basis for non-acceptance in determining master-
servant relationship under NLRA) ; Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R.,
320 U. S. 356, 360 (1943) (rejecting right-remedy rationale of statutes of limitation as
ground of decision).
14. Levinson v. Spector Motor Co., 330 U. S. 649, 689 (1947) (dissenting opinion);
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products Co., 322 U. S. 607, 637 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
15. United States v. South Buffalo Ry., 333 U. S. 771, 785 (1948) (dissenting);
but cf. Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 331 U. S. 17, 26 (1947) (con-
curring on ground that arrangements between parties had been entered into in reliance
on Walling 'v. Belo Corp.) ; Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14, 21 (1946) (question-
ing validity of concept of Congressional acquiescence by inaction but concurring solely
on the authority of Caminetti v. United States).
16. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 180-181 (1949) ; Levinson v. Spector
Motor Co., 330 U. S. 659, 689 (1947) (dissenting opinion). Similar phrasing crops up
in nearly every one of Rutledge's opinions in this area.
17. 3 Co. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584).
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print, the composite facts as raw materials, and to fashion the legal finished
product which the draftsmen had envisaged. To change metaphors, the Court
was dealing with a corpus, not with disjecta membra.. Particular applications
were not particularly determinable detail by detail. The search was rather for
a rounded program, a statutory policy and purpose. This being discovered,
the question became one of whether the cae at hand fell within the ambit
of that program.
Infrequently this approach led to over-refined, perhaps even tortured,
analysis of the facts."' More characteristically, it produced comprehensive,
penetrating, Brandeis-like explorations of complex data-marketing practices
in the beet sugar industry, 0 the various pattern of production of processed
agricultural commodities, 2 the institutional peculiarities of newspaper distri-
bution 2m-developing aspects of the case at hand which brought it within
the statutory policy.
There was no like articulation of the process by which that policy itself
was discovered. It emerged as an intuitive appraisal, reasonable but obscure
in its foundations. Therein lies perhaps the chief defect and the chief danger
of Rutledge's method as a tool for use by others with less robust common sense
and more specialized sympathies than he; though it may well be that in law, as
in chemistry, what is organic cannot be crystallized without loss of its vitality.
But with him the method worked. It may be said, in the light of his dissent in
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,22 that, in adjusting legislation resting
on the commerce power and that based on other constitutional grants (in that
case the patent clause) he tended to find greater force and vitality in the
former, on the ground that the exercise of the commerce power was an ex-
pression of a general, that of the patent power merely of a special policy. And
from the dissent in Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 2 3 it appears that, in
accommodating provisions of different statutes, both enacted under the com-
merce clause, the accommodation was to be made "in a manner which will give
to each its maximum effect"2 4 and the affirmative operation of one should not
be curbed by the latent potential of the other except as that was clearly directed.
The dominant attitudes which appear from a survey of Rutledge's per-
formance in construing commerce clause legislation are thus two : the attitude
of integration, of stressing the ensemble, of disinclination to look to dissociated
fragments; and the attitude of affirmation, of concern with the postive
18. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689, 698 (1948) (concurring opinion).
19. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219
(1948).
20. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products Co., 322 U. S. 607, 625 (1944) (dis'enting
opinion).
21. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944).
22. 323 U. S. 386, 438 (1945).
23. 330 U. S. 649, 685 (1947).
24. Id. at 691.
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achievement of a dynamic program. Such attitudes were natural and even in-
evitable for one who viewed the commerce clause as a grant of federal power.25
The commerce power is not unlimited. Extrinsic limitations arise from
other parts of the Constitution, specifically from the Due Process Clause,2
but there are also intrinsic limitations having some sort of ill-defined relation
with the position of the states in our federal system.2 7  Whatever these latter
may be, however, so far as the federal government is concerned, the clause
constitutes a "positive affirmation . . . of power. ' 2  For a long time the
power was unchallenged and virtually unexercised, because its very existence
under the circumstances of the times sufficed. There was no need for more
than casual regulation ;29 but "economic change" induced "increasing scope and
variety of federal legislation." 3  M\omentous increases in industrialization,
mechanization, and concentration of economic enterprise accompanied the
growth of the nation and brought Congressional legislation under the com-
merce power.2 ' "A democratic nation must have a government endowed with
powers sufficient to meet its external and internal needs. These today neces-
sarily must be large. '32  The power over interstate commerce is then a de-
pendent variable, a function of our economic life, not a historical or juristic
constant. The grant is a grant and confers authority as great as the need
for regulation, whatever that may be. The pressure of events generated
federal regulation and justified the regulation which it generated. At one
time, the formula might be possession of power "necessary and proper" to
render effective the granted power over commerce, at another that of "affect-
ing" commerce. 33 The important thing to Rutledge was not a nice doctrinal
analysis or a precise definition, neither of which he ever systematically at-
tempted, 4 but the synchronization of governmental power with economic life.
25. This view was expounded judicially in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219 (1948), and extrajudicially in A DECLARATIO N OF LEGAL
FAITH.
26. RUTLEDGE, op. cit. supra 43.
27. Compare ". . . [O]ther limits are dictated by considerations affecting the
necessary and appropriate scope for play of state rather than federal power," ibid., with
"This does not mean that state power is a limitation upon federal power within the
federal sphere. . . It does mean that, wherever the farthest boundary of the power of
Congress may go, that line provides a limit induced by the incidence of state power at
that point." Id. at 34 n.6 This attempted correlation of state and federal power is
somewhat perplexing.
28. Id. at 33.
29. Id. at 31.
30. Id. at 42; ef. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 415 (1946).
31. RUTLEDGE, op. cit. supra 31.
32. Id. at 76.
33. The two doctrines were after all broadly equivalent. Compare Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 232 n.11 (1948) with Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 423 (1946).
34. "We do not yet know how to def'ne commerce with broadly inclusive words of
precision. We only know how to chip out the definition bit by bit." RUTLEDGE, op. cit.
supra 36. "Larger emphasis is put on scrutiny of particular facts and concrete conse-
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"The vital thing is the effect on commerce, not the precise point at which
the restraint occurs or begins to take effect. . . ." The evolution of judicial
doctrine as to federal regulation of interstate commerce was disfigured by the
Knight case,36 with its "artificial and mechanical separation of 'production'
and 'manufacturing' from 'commerce,' without regard to their economic con-
tinuity, the effect of the former two upon the latter, and the varying methods
by which the several processes are organized, related, and carried on.1'37 That
decision had substantially nullifying effects for coverage of "the [commerce]
clause" as well as of "the [Sherman] Act.13 8  It so hampered effective Con-
gressional regulation of interstate commerce that it carried the seeds of its
own destruction. 9 Its suggestion of a complete dichotomy between local activ-
ity and interstate commerce was contradicted by the decision in the Shreveport
Rate Cases,4 ° regarded by Rutledge as one of the two or three conspicuous
landmarks in the development of commerce clause doctrine.41 Shreveport
dealt specifically with the transportation aspect of interstate commerce but had
a significance transcending transportation enterprise.42 ".. . [T] he decision
substituted judgment as to practical impeding effects upon . . .commerce for
rubrics concerning its boundaries as the basic criterion of effective congres-
sional action. '43  For a matter of decades, the disjunctive principle of the
Knight case and the conjunctive notions of Shreveport competed for judicial
acceptance, with the latter ultimately triumphing and fixing the shape of Con-
gressional power over commerce. 4  The Knight conception of emphasizing the
quences, with an eye on their practical bearings... Correspondingly, less stress, though
in my opinion still too much, is placed upon large generalizations and dogmatisms inherited
from levels of debate time has lowered." Id. at 70.
35. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 238
(1948).
36. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
37. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 229
(1948).
38. Ibid.
39. . . . [Had its full force remained unmodified, the Act today would
be a weak instrument, as would also the power of Congress, to reach evils
in all the vast operations of our gigantic national industrial system
antecedent to interstate sale and transportation of manufactured products.
Indeed, it and succeeding decisions, embracing the same artificially drawn
lines, produced a series of consequences for the exercise of national power
over industry conducted on a national scale which the evolving nature of
our industrialism foredoomed to reversal.
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 230
(1948).
40. Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914).
41. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S.
219, 232 (1948) ; RUTLEDGE, Op. cit. supra 42.
42. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S.
219, 232 n.11 (1948).
43. Id. at 233.
44. RUTLEDGE, op. cit. supra 42-43.
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several links and not the whole chain is "no longer effective to restrict
Congress' power.
4 5
"It [is] necessary no longer to search for some sharp point or line where
interstate commerce ends and intrastate commerce begins, in order to decide
whether Congress' commands [are] effective. '46  "It is the effect upon
commerce, not the moment when its cause arises" which is relevant.4 7  "The
inquiry whether the restraint occurs in one phase or another, interstate
or intrastate, is now merely a preliminary step except for those situations in
which no aspect of or substantial effect upon interstate commerce can be
found in the sum of the facts presented."' ' i Nor need the individual trans-
action or occurrence from which the case arises separately have appreciable
independent effect on interstate enterprise if it is a member of a class
which does have an interstate commerce impact.49 The total pattern and not
the isolated circumstance is the determinant of Congressional power.
So Rutledge's practice and theory were reciprocally consistent. Again,
we see the conviction that the clause is to be given a positive content and
operation, is to be read as a full authority to Congress to exercise oversight
of the nation's economic life coextensive with the national interest." And
again there is the refusal to treat facts or events in business or industry as
discrete phenomena, the regard for relationships and consequences. His
exposition of the qualities of Congressional power over interstate commerce
45. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219,
229 (1948).
46. Id. at 232.
47. Id. at 234.
48. Ibid.
49. Congress' power to keep the interstate market free of goods produced
under conditions inimical to the general welfare may be exercised in indi-
vidual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate com-
merce; it is enough that the individual activity when multiplied into a
general practice is subject to federal control or that it contains a threat to
the interstate economy that requires preventive regulation.
Id. at 236.
50. The commerce clause is in no sense a limitation upon the power of
Congress over interstate and foreign commerce. On the contrary, it is,
as Marshall declared in Gibbons v. Ogden, a grant to Congress of plenary
and supreme authority over those subjects. The only limitation it places
upon Congress' power is in respect to what constitutes commerce, includ-
ing whatever rightly may be found to affect it sufficiently to make
congressional regulation necessary or appropriate.
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 423 (1946). It is not to be
inferred that Rutledge limited the clause to matters involving economic enterprise;
indeed, the contrary appears from failure to suggest constitutional doubts in his special
concurrence in Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14, 21 (1946), a case involving non-
commercial movement between states; cf. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327
U. S. 186 (1946) (publishing business subject to Congressional control under the com-
merce clause).
The power to "regulate" was ample in his opinion to permit Congress to prohibit
interstate commerce and to discriminate against it in favor of local commerce. See
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 434 (1946).
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harmonizes perfectly with the interpretations which he gave to statutes passed
in the exercise of that power.
H
• . . [C]leanly as the commerce clause has worked affirmatively
on the whole, its implied negative operation on state power has been
uneven, at times highly variable. More often than not, in matters
more governable by logic and less by experience, the business of
negative implication is slippery. . . . That possibility is broadened
immeasurably when not logic alone, but large choices of policy,
affected in this instance by evolving experience of federalism,
control in giving content to the implied negation.51
The operation of the commerce clause as a potential limitation on state
regulatory power has, for almost a century, presented mostly a question of
the practical consequences and applications of a fairly well-settled theory (the
companion but somewhat specialized development with regard to state taxa-
tion is reserved for separate treatment in a later section)."2 The text of the
clause makes no reference to state power and there is evidence that originally,
except for the curbs provided by the supremacy clause, "3 in cases where
Congress legislated, no independent hampering of state authority was under-
stood to have arisen as a corollary of the grant of federal power over inter-
state commerce. 4  But a tradition-probably originating in some of Marshall's
bold dicta in Brown v. Maryland'5 and matured by a concatenation of federally
minded historiography, the outcome of the Civil War, the integrating eco-
nomic and social impulses that have dominated the American scene, and its
own uncritical repetition-is thoroughly established that one of the prime evils
under the Articles of Confederation, and hence a barrier which the Consti-
tution was principally devised to remove, was a body of obstructions which
51. Id. at 418.
52. See p. 517 et seq. infra.
53. U. S. CONST. ART. VI § 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land: and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing.
54. Cf., e.g., Madison's letter of February 13, 1829, to J. C. Cabell, 3 FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 478 (1911). See also, Abel, The Commerce
Clause in The Constitutional Convention. and in Contemporary Comment, 25 'INN. L.
REV. 432, 481 et seq. (1941).
55. It may be doubted whether any of the evils proceeding from the feebleness
of the federal government, contributed more to that great revolution
which introduced the present system, than the deep and general conviction,
that commerce ought to be regulated by Congress.
12 Wheat. 419, 446 (U. S. 1827). The statement was made in connection with foreign
commerce, in which context it seems strictly accurate; but it has been generalized so
as to embrace interstate commerce and subsequently cited without observing the dis-
tinction.
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the then laws of the states imposed on their reciprocal intercourse. The myth
is by now a venerable one and probably, given the type of national civilization
which we have evolved, as necessary as it is venerable.. Certainly it is one
which Rutledge explicitly accepted 6 although, his genius not being ordinarily
5 7
antiquarian in cast but concerned rather with the present and future situations
governed by decision, it is unlikely that he gave the argument controlling
weight." Whatever the basis, it is settled law that the commerce clause is, in
one of Rutledge's favorite metaphors, a "two-edged instrument"59 with
effects upon the authority of the states as well as of Congress.
The fundamental doctrine as to the nature of those effects was spelled
out as early as 1851 in the great case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens" where
Curtis laid it down that not the nature of "the power" but the nature of the
subjects of regulation determined the negative swath of the commerce clause,
with some subjects national in nature requiring uniformity of regulation, and
others local in nature requiring (since his time amended to read, "admitting
of") diversity of regulation. As to the former, the states might not, even in
the absence of federal action, prescribe rules applicable to interstate activities;
as to the latter they might do so unless and until Congress enacted a controlling
policy. Thus, the Cooley case solved the issue of the validity of state legisla-
tion in the absence of Congressional action. The solution has since remained
essentially unchanged.
Where Congress has acted the theory of the law has been more murky
and no formulation of doctrine yet proposed has received as nearly universal
acceptance as the Cooley rule. By force of the supremacy clause, state regula-
tions in conflict with Congressional action must of course give way, whether
their subjects be local or national in nature. As to non-conflicting state regu-
lations, there has emerged the concept of supersedure by Congressional oc-
cupancy of a field"' under which wholly consistent state legislation, whether
supplemental62 or virtually parallel6 3 to that of Congress, is devitalized by the
56. RUTLEDGE, op. cit. supra 25.
57. But see his refined analysis of the record in the Cooley case in support of the
proposition that its doctrine as to state authority to regulate certain aspects of com-
merce applied alike to interstate and to foreign commerce. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v.
Michigan, 333 U. S. 28, 38 n.19 (1948).
58. He supplemented it with the argument that limitation on state powers was not
merely intended but necessary, see Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S.
408, 418 (1946), a somewhat doubtful proposition logically in view of the existence of
the supremacy clause.
59. Id. at 417; Rutledge, op. cit. supra 33, 45.
60. 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851).
61. This idea furnished the technical ground of decision in the very first case to
come to the Supreme Court involving the commerce clause, Gibbons v.. Ogden, 9 Wheat.
1 (U. S. 1824).
62. E.g., Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Van Zant, 260 U. S. 459 (1923).
63. E.g., Southern Ry. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 236 U. S. 439 (1915); Erie R.R. v.
New York, 233 U. S. 671 (1914).
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adoption of the latter. The concept may be applied even though the subject
be one local in nature, and hence admitting of diversity, or, under some of the
more extreme holdings, even though the Congressional regulation be the mere
establishment in an agency of a general potential of supervision unexercised
and not about to be exercised.6 4 There has further emerged agreement that,
whether the states' anterior and independent action would have been paralyzed
by Congressional inaction (subject national in character) or by Congressional
action (supersedure) when and so far as Congress manifests a willingness
that the states may regulate the Court will not decree otherwise. Divergent
rationalizations have attended this result because of difficulties as to how
Congress can authorize what the Constitution denies, and consequently doubts
have been expressed as to whether it is the Constitution or only the will of
Congress implied from its silence which forbids state action and which accord-
ingly the Court must construe.
A comprehensive view of state regulations impinging on interstate com-
merce must then embrace three major variants, marked by as many postulates
as to Congress' conduct, each having its own difficulties of application. With
the first variant, where Congress has not spoken, the law has been settled
since the Cooley case; but the characterization of subjects as local in nature
admitting of diversity or national in character and requiring uniformity calls
for the threshing out of complex combinations of facts and policy. But this
matter is one of diminishing importance as the list of matters on which Con-
gress has not spoken dwindles toward extinction." Finding Congressional
legislation nearly or remotely related to the state regulation involved, we are
confronted with the second variant, whose major problem is one of interpreta-
tion, the definition of the area of control which Congress has occupied and
from which consequently it has, under the doctrine of supersedure, effected
an ouster of the states. The third variant, where the federal statute speaks
assentingly of state regulation, also incidentally presents issues of interpretation
as to the areas approved for state actioi; but this has been the area where the
statement of an adequate legal theory has been peculiarly troublesome. To the
first, Rutledge contributed something; to the second, little; to the third, much.
Robertson v. California6 raised questions as to the validity of two sections
of the state code, one forbidding persons to act as insurance agents without
having obtained a license, the other in substance penalizing the writing in
California of policies with companies not admitted to do business there. In
view of the state's policy not to admit mutual companies without prescribed
reserves (with the exception of some which qualified under a "grandfather"
clause) the effect of the act was to wholly exclude unqualified mutuals from
64. E.g., Oregon-Washington R.R. & N. Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 (1926).
65. Cf. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 413 n.8 (1946).
66. 328 U. S. 440 (1946).
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the domestic California insurance market. Congress, restrained by constitu-
tional limitations supposed to exist, from Paul v. Virgnia67 to United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Association,68 had abstained from legislating
with respect to insurance until after the policy solicitation for which Robert-
son was indicted. The Court, excluding as a basis for support of the convic-
tion the explicit acquiescence in state regulation thereafter expressed in the
McCarran Act 9 in order to avoid possible ex post facto contentions which
reliance on it might generate, dealt with the case on the basis of the validity
of a state regulation in an area of Congressional silence, sustaining the
statutes and the conviction for having written policies in California as agent
for an unadmitted and inadmissible Arizona mutual.
Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan70 also involved a criminal prosecution
and sustained application of a state criminal statute over objections of com-
merce clause invalidity. Indeed, the activities as to which Michigan was
sustained in applying her statute were foreign, and not merely interstate
commerce. It was a very special sort of foreign commerce, however, involv-
ing transportation of passengers to and from, and only to and from, a Canadian
island which constituted in effect a recreational annex to the city of Detroit.
Defendant's activities seem to have been limited to the conduct of the insular
amusement park and the transportation by excursion steamer of pleasure
seekers to partake of its delights. The statute, the Michigan Civil Rights
Act, was of standard pattern, forbidding those engaged in the common callings
(among whom the Michigan Supreme Court as a matter of state law placed
defendant) to discriminate in service on grounds of race, creed, or color. In
applying a company policy against negroes, under which Bob-Lo would not
furnish them transportation from Detroit (nor, consequently, entertainment
in Canada) passage was refused a negro member of a mixed group to whom
a block of tickets had been sold. No federal or Canadian legislation bore on
the matter of racial discrimination by carriers.
Rutledge's opinions for the Court in these two cases are the principal
sources of information as to his attitude toward state regulation where Con-
gress is silent. Doctrinally he adhered to the formula of the Cooley case, the
significance of which he amply appreciated. 71 Its twofold classification was
for him not merely valid but operative to run a boundary line between the
constitutionally pefmitted and the constitutionally prohibited, rather than
67. 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1868).
68. 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
69. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (Supp. 1946).
70. 333 U. S. 28 (1948).
71. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219,
232 (1948); Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28, 38 (1948); Rutledge,
op. cit. supra 58, 70.
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just to establish a canon for construing the silence of Congress."2 Once
a subject was determined to be national in character, the Constitution by
its own force excluded the states from applying their regulations."3
Acceptance of the Cooley formula did not eliminate the difficulties of
judgment but only shifted them. The Court must still distinguish those sub-
jects needing uniformity of regulation from those for which diversity was
appropriate. He scorned the flabby evasion of labelling condemned statutes
"regulations of commerce" and approved ones regulations "incidentally af-
fecting" it." He never resorted in commerce clause cases to the shimmering
imprecisions of "police power" verbiage, but faced up to the proposition
that the validity of a regulation of commerce was involved.7"
The guide Rutledge suggested is oddly reminiscent of the currently over-
worked and severely mangled "clear-and-present-danger" test."0 That test,
deriving from a vastly different context, can hardly have been supposed to
furnish analogies useful for detailed decision but it does indicate how strongly
he felt that judicial reticence in the invalidation of regulations was in order.
Such a view was congenial to his general premises-his agreement as to the use-
fulness of the states for carrying on experiments in regulation,7 his awareness
of the rebuffs which earlier Courts had received from earlier Congresses for
proneness to conclude that uniformity of regulation was required, 7 his convic-
tion that the trend of constitutional development was "toward sanction-
ing state regulation formerly regarded as inconsistent with Congress' un-
exercised power over commerce.17 9  In this setting, the particulars of regu-
lation were to be evaluated.
72. RUTLEDGE, op. cit. supra 54-62.
73. Id. at 66.
74. Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440, 448 (1946) ; RUTLEDGE, op. cit. supra
51 n.3.
75. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28, 34 (1948) ; Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 332 U. S. 507, 512-513 (1947) (emphatically
rejecting the mechanical test of reduction of gas pressure as end of interstate commerce
on broken-package analogy) ; cf. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408,
426 (1946).
76. . . . [Tihe dormancy of Congress' power still gives occasion . .. for
the implied prohibition of the commerce clause to work. The exclusion,
narrowing with theyears, has come on the whole to require substantial
danger, real or actually threatening, of creating the effects the clause
was drawn to prevent.
Rutledge, op. cit. supra 72.
77. Republic Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U. S. 62, 96 (1948) (dissenting opinion):
. . . [In considering the proper scope for state experimentation, it is
important that we indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the
states' action. They should be free to improve their regulatory techniques
as scientific knowledge advances, for here too experimentation is the life-
blood of progress.
78. ". . . [Slad experiences with judicial conceptions of the need for uniformity
have made judges unwilling to jump too readily to the conclusion that this branch of the
Cooley formula applies." RUTLEDGE, op. cit. supra 71.
79. Id. at 68.
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Itemizing (not cataloguing) particulars deemed relevant to decision, he
instanced "the degree of localization of the commerce involved: . . . the
attenuating effects, if any, upon the commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states likely to be produced by applying the state regulation;
or . . . actual probability of conflicting regulation by different sovereign-
ties.'" '  While an interstate or foreign commerce enterprise ought not be
subjected to realized or gravely threatened clash of dissonant state regula-
tions,"' the hypothetical possibility of inconsistent regulation is entitled to
little weight.8 2 "The commerce clause is not a guaranty of the right to im-
port into a state whatever one may please, absent a prohibition by Congress,
regardless of the effects of the importation upon the local community."' 3 The
states may, for the protection of ,their people, bar entry of injurious matter,
even by the licensing device, at least if transportation is not the activity to be
licensed"4 (although, quaere, as to how far their control over egress parallels
that over ingress) ;85 but, even so, the differential consequences of the regula-
tion upon the behavior of the regulated would seem to be regarded as rele-
vant.' 3 The prime factor, however, is the extent of the local incidence of
the regulation.
So, Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan was distinguishable from cases
cited in argument therein because "None involved so completely and locally
insulated a segment of foreign or interstate commerce. In none was the
business affected merely an adjunct of a single locality or community as is
the business done here so largely. '8 7  In Robertson v. California, it was of
controlling importance that "appellant's activities were of a kind which vitally
affect the welfare and security of the local community, the state, and their
residents . . . They had in fact a highly 'special interest' in his localized
pursuit of this phase of the . . . interstate . . . business . . . [A]ppellant's
80. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28, 39 (1948).
81. Id. at 40-41 (distinguishing Hall v. DeCuir and Morgan v. Virginia).
82. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S. 507
(1947) ; cf. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28, 37 (1948).
83. Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440, 458 (1946).
84. Ibid; but see Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission,
332 U. S. 507, 522-523 (1947) :
State power to regulate interstate commerce, wherever it exists, is not the
power to destroy it, unless Congress has expressly so provided. It is
the power to require that it be done on terms reasonably related to the
necessity for protecting the local interests on which the power rests.
85. Rutledge's -explicit concurrence in the opinion in Toomer v. W17itsell, 334 U. S.
385, 409 (1948), insofar as regulatory aspects of South Carolina's legislation were
involved with qualification confined to taxation aspects, suggests the query, which is
consistent with the superior appreciation of the claims of the market state over the
state of origin voiced by him in Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249, 259 (1946) (concurring
opinion) and elsewhere.
86. Cf. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28, 39 (1948): "And in none
was a complete exclusion from passage made." "
87. Ibid.
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activities called in question were concentrated in the regulating state, although
affecting or constituting interstate commerce." ' ,8 If no substantial share of
the instances governed by the regulation are of concern outside its citizen
community, the state's claim to exercise control is hard to deny. Little, if any,
importance attaches to the kind of local policies which the states seek to imple-
ment by the questioned controls; levels of rates and charges, 9 requirements
of minimum standards of vocational competence and responsibility,9" the
stamping out of fraud91 and-disease,9 2 and the furtherance of sociological ideals
of community relations" are equally accepted as legitimate objects of state
concern. It is rather the degree of local concentration that is of critical sig-
nificance. Interstate enterprise so enmeshed with local activities that its
exemption would jeopardize a whole regulatory structure which in its bearing
upon most of the persons and transactions affected is purely local must share
the common fate.9 4  If it avoids federal regulation de facto by being so
domesticated within the several states that the national interest is abstract
and illusory and the only concrete concern a local one, it cannot simultaneously
escape state regulation de jure under the Cooley doctrine.95
It must be admitted that we do not get from a study of Rutledge's
handling of the Cooley situation a clear doctrinal exegesis. The construction
of one would have been repugnant to him with his conviction that deter-
minations have varied and will vary in accordance with "continuing dif-
ference in policy and in judgment of effects."9  Solution rests finally in
judgment instead of reason. What Rutledge did contribute was clarifica-
tion of some of the forces and the elements which influence judgment in
areas where the Congressional power is dormant.
On the classical supersedure problem, the adjustment of cognate Con-
gressional and state legislation where the former is mute as to the latter, he
wrote no opinions either for the Court or otherwise. He did, of course,
recognize that there was in every case, at least latently, a question of inter-
pretation of extant federal statutes to determine whether their coverage
embraced the matters affected by state legislation.9 7  Further, he spoke
88. Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440, 449 (1946) ; cf. Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S. 507, 522 (1947).
89. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S. 507,
522 (1947).
90. Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440 (1946).
91. Ibid.
92. Id. at 459.
93. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28 (1948).
94. See Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440, 459-460 (1946).
95. See Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S.
507, 522 (1947).
96. RUTLEDGE, op. cit. szpra 72. "... (J)udges do not automatically agree upon
what requires uniformity and what does not. Here too considerations of policy have
swayed their judgments." RUTLEDGE, op. cit. supra 67.
97. Id. at 53 n.4.
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emphatically in favor of curtailing the consequences of supersedure by not
imputing to Congress a desire to occupy a field wide in extent, so as very
nearly to confine the doctrine's operation to the essential inconsistency predi-
cated by the supremacy clause.98 Beyond that, we have nothing from him 0
His major theoretical contribution to the law of regulation of commerce
was in connection with programs of co-operative federal-state control. Occa-
sionally the aspect of such programs presented for consideration involves in-
terpretation and application of the substance of the federal statute, in which
case Rutledge, in shaping his decision, took into account the co-operative pur-
pose of the legislation and the consequences for the state policy which it was
designed to render effectual."' The stock issue has had to do, however, with
the extent to which and the grounds upon which state regulations will be given
effect when favored with a Congressional blessing. "More and more ... Con-
gress and the states have come to work harmoniously, dovetailing their legisla-
tion in the regulation of commerce. And the notion has been put to rest, one
may hope, that the commerce clause is itself . . . a limitation . . . upon a con-
joined and consistent exercise of the powers of Congress and the states."'01
.. [T]he decisions . . . in every instance thus far not later overturned,
98. The idea that Congress has 'occupied the field,' and thereby precluded
legislation by the states, though not altogether eliminated, works within
narrower confines. The search here is properly for irreconcilable in-
consistency, with emphasis upon reconciliation wherever possible, in the
place of earlier easy finding of occupancy. Real and inescapable conflict
there must be, absent expression congressional preemption, when the basis
for outlawing state action is conflict with Congress' declared policies
within its field of primacy.
Id. at 70-71.
99. His votes do not tell much. Joinder in Frankfurter's dissent in H. P. Hood &
sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U. S. 525, 545 (1949), is consistent with a reluctance to read
federal action as conflicting with state regulation. In the State Labor Relations Act
cases-LaCrosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S.
18 (1949), Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S.
301 (1949), and A. F. of L. Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336
U. S. 245 (1949)-his notation of concurrence in the former two and joinder in dissent
in the latter point in somewhat variant directions and, especially in the light of references
in federal legislation to state laws, do not illuminate his attitude toward supersedure.
His concurrence in the result in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 784
(1945), perhaps gets coloration from his citation of the case, in Panhandle Pipe Line Co.
v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S. 507, 521 (1947), for the proposition that
"Congress has undoubted power. to define the distribution of power over interstate com-
merce," suggesting that he accepted the superseding effect of the federal legislation
which Chief Justice Stone so summarily rejected. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
supra at 766; but this is conjectural and, if true, indicates only that his reluctance to
enlarge the field of Congressional occupancy was exceeded by his disinclination to find
absence of a local interest. The differentiation by which, in Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 244 n.24 (1948), he saved the
authority of Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), also presupposes that the operation
of federal statutes may contain implied conditions allowing room for state action.
100. United States v. Sheridan, 329 U. S. 379 (1946).
101. RUTLEDGE, op. cit. supra 71.
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have sustained co-ordinated action taken by Congress and the states in the regu-
lation of commerce."1 2 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service
Commission'"° was thus, in its result, an exemplar of an unbroken tradition.
Although this harmonious pattern of decision has made prediction easy,
the reasoning supporting it has been beset by confusion and disagreement.
There is no constitutional difficulty where the subject of regulation comes
within the "local-diversity" branch of the Cooley formula since no one could
seriously urge that Congressionally uttered approval blighted what would
flourish if Congress were silent.1 14  Nor is there, if the negative implications
for state power are regarded as inferences from the silence of Congress
rather than as limitations established by the Constitution, a construction of
its silently expressed will. If Congress has regulated in any case, by action
or by inaction, it may, by further speech, clarify or correct misunderstanding
of its will-as readily where the intention is imputed from silence as where
it is attributed to language. This silence-of-Congress approach, traceable to
Taney, gets around the puzzle which is inherent in the M\1arshall notion that
the Constitution by its own operation curtailed the regulatory power of the
states, ' as to how Congress can sanction what the very Constitution forbids.
Efforts to find a solution in the divestiture theory' created a threat to the
basic constitutional principle of judicial supremacy by suggesting that power
resided in Congress to settle the scope and meaning of Constitutional terms
in a sense contrary to that declared by the Court. While the Court has con-
sistently acquiesced in Congressional revisions of its decisions which on com-
merce clause grounds denied state powers to regulate particular subjects,'0 7 it
would be dangerous doctrine to do so on a ground which would undermine
judicial review.
Yet Rutledge, because of other apprehended vices in the silence-of-
Congress approach, rejected it."" Sensible of the difficulties alluded to, he
102. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 433 (1946).
103. 332 U. S. 507 (1947).
104. Rutledge got satisfaction from demonstration that state regulation was con-
sonant with the direction of federal policy even in cases where, for purposes of decision,
he found that the Congressional power was dormant and relief was given on the Cooley
formula. Cf. Bob-Lo Excusion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28, 37 n.16 (1948) : Robertson
v. California, 328 U. S. 440, 462 (1946).
105. This analysis of the respective positions of Marshall and Taney is that which
Rutledge accepted. RUTLEDGE, op. cit. supra 55-56.
106. See In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 562 (1891)
No reason is perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide that certain
designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule
which divests them of that character at an earlier period of time than
would otherwise be the case, it is not within its competency to do so.
See also Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 (1936).
107. RUTLEDGE, op. cit.. supra 63; Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S.
408, 425 (1946).
108. RUTLEDGE, op. cit. supra 70. For an analysis of the objections to the doctrine,
see RUTLEDGE, op. cit. supra 62-63.
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examined afresh the operation of the commerce clause upon state and federal
power. 10 0 The Constitution, he concluded, did affirmatively grant powers of
regulation to Congress and did itself negatively subtract from the regulatory
powers of the states""' but the grant and the restriction were not reciprocals."'
The same commerce clause, which excluded the states from areas of regulation,
conferred on Congress a power to regulate which was plenary in character and
might be exercised in any manner and to any extent requisite for the effective
exercise of control over commerce so long as not repugnant to other provisions
of the Constitution." 2  Rutledge saw that the root of the difficulty about
Congress' authorizing what the Constitution forbade was the assumption that
the federal and state powers were strictly complementary, and, if the power
bestowed on Congress was of a magnitude unrelated to the restrictions on the
states, the logical necessity of regarding acquiescent federal statutes as a
restoration of some portion of withdrawn power in defiance of the Constitution
disappeared." 3 His perception of the significance of this non-equivalence in
the positive and negative consequences of the clause gave the answer to the
riddle. Congress, when it sanctioned state regulations, was not giving to the
states the power which the Constitution had denied them but was exercising
its own constitutionally granted authority to regulate,'14 its exercise taking the
permissible form of a discretionary policy determination that the continuing
adaptation and enforcement of controls in particular areas by the several states
was the mode of regulation which it elected." 5 Congress thus did not restore
to the states powers of which they were constitutionally deprived. It only
exercised the regulatory authority the Constitution gave it but exercised it
by the creation of a potential which the states' regulations made kinetic. The
109. His ideas were not completely original as of course hardly any intellectual
product is. Thus, Hughes' opinion in Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illino:s Central
R. R., 299 U. S. 334 (1937), anticipates in considerable measure Rutledge's argument but
obscures it by language squinting toward the notion that the subject of regulation involved
was such as to admit of diversity under the Cooley formula and otherwise fails to
probe the issues as acutely or to organize the explanation as regularly as Rntledge did.
110. RUTLEDGE, op. cit. supra 66.
111. . . . as the law has developed, the arc travelled by the negative
pendulum has turned out not to be co-extensive with that in which the
affirmative one oscillates. The scope of the prohibition is not correla-
tive, in any of the basic implications, with the full reach of the positive
power given to Congress.
Id. at 47.
112. See Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 423 (1946).
113. Rutledge, op. cit. supra 65; Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S.
408, 423 (1946).
114. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S.
507 (1947).
115. Since the states were exercising not a power given them by Congress but their
own independently possessed powers, only made effective because Congress adopted as
its policy the system of regulations enacted or to be enacted by the states, objection that
a delegation of power by Congress to the states was involved was not tenable. Pru-
dential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 440 (1946).
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curve of commerce regulation was none the less a function of Congressional
power because the equation contained a second variable.
Questions of interpretation and application inevitably remain as to
whether Congress has reserved any phases of a subject for regulation by its
own direct legislative prescriptions or whether it elects to have some phases
regulated through the medium of recognized or approved state legislation.
The references to Congressional purpose and policy, already noted as central
to Rutledge's general process of construing federal statutes passed in exercise
of the commerce power,' are again relied on to furnish the guiding prin-
ciple.117 Specifically he finds a policy to provide a comprehensive and
unified system of regulation which will afford full scope for control to each
regulating government, 1 8 a concept akin to his idea that in the accommodation
of federal statutes each is to be given room for maximum affirmative opera-
tion.1 9 If Congress moulded its permission to conform to anterior patterns
of judicial decision, expressly limiting its own directives to matters theretofore
held immune from state control, acceptance of its own clear definition of the
field it proposed to occupy meant that state regulatory power was not to be
displaced in any particular as to which it might have been exercised prior to the
statute's adoption."20 If the statute were more broadly conceived to remove
any obstructions thought to flow from Congress' own power, whether dormant
or exercised, all commerce clause limitations relevant to the action of either
government acting singly were obviated.12 1 Convinced that Congress had in
mind the creation of comprehensive and effective regulatory schemes and was
not contemplating ineffective regulation at either level, 1 2 Rutledge consistently
116. See p. 500 et seq. supra.
117. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S.
507 (1947) (passim); Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 429-430
(1946).
118. Cases cited note 117 supra. This does not of course imply uniformity since
Congress, in choosing to cast its regulation in this form, does it in evident recognition
and contemplation of variances in the regulations of the states so that diversity of regu-
lation from state to state is no objection. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328
U. S. 408 (1946).
119. See note 23 supra.
120. See Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S.
507, 519 (1947).
121. See Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 430-431 (1946).
122. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S. 507,
520 (1947). In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 247 (1947), Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, in his dissent in which Rutledge joined, objected that "The Court displaces
settled and fruitful State authority though it cannot replace it with federal authority."
This regard for a practical and integrated program of co-ordinated state and federal
regulation gives a consistency to the position of these two justices in this and the com-
panion case of Rice v. Chicago Board of Trade, 331 U. S. 218 (1947) (unanimoui
opinion), which none of their associates can fully claim.
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treated such legislation as enabling rather than disabling in operation.1 23
The preference for a functional and positive approach which characterized
his interpretation of the commerce power possessed and exercised by Congress
is likewise uniformly and strongly manifest throughout the full range of
questions raised under the commerce clause by state regulation.
'III
Not the tax in a vacuum of words but its practical consequences
for the doing of interstate commerce in applications to concrete
facts are our concern. 24
Constructive as was Rutledge's contribution to discussion of the problems
involved in the regulation, federal or state, of interstate commerce, his dis-
tinctive achievement-and the bulk of his judicial125 exposition-relates to the
meaning of the commerce clause as it affects the validity of state taxation.
That is a subject which had been worked and reworked, now subtly, now
crudely, with distinctions, some real, some spurious, suggested, rejected, fol-
lowed, disregarded, misapplied, subdistinguished or reiterated, with busy
inventiveness shown by the states in devising strange new taxes or furbishing
battered old ones. It is an area where old-fashioned legalism, economic and
political pressures, and deductive logic serially, concurrently, and retroactively
figured articulately or inarticulately in the process of decision; and the
body of traditional law thereon is fearfully and wonderfully made.1 26
"Subject" and "measure" had emerged as classifying concepts, with in-
vestigation and reconciliation clustering around questions of validity of the
123. Cf. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S.
307, 519 (1947):
It would be an exceedingly incongruous result if a statute so motivated,
designed, and shaped to bring about more effective regulation, and par-
ticularly more effective state regulation, were construed in the teeth of
those objects, and the import of its wording as well, to cut down regu-
latory power and to so in a manner making the state less capable of
regulation than before the statute's adoption.
124. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 431 (1946).
125. Conversely, his extrajudicial exploration in A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH
makes almost no explicit reference to taxation. Beyond a passing query as to whether
"regulation" embraces "taxation," left dangling, id. at 29, all that appears in incidental
footnote mention of state taxation. See, e.g., id. at 58 n.15, and citation of taxation-of-
commerce cases (often in connection with regulation of commerce cases). Id. at 71 n.33.
126. The course of development was charted by Powell, Indirect Encroachment on
Federal Authority by the Taxing Power of the States, 31 HARV. L. REV. 321, 572, 721,
932 (1918), 32 HARV. L. REv. 234, 374, 634, 902 (1919), a series of articles some acquaint-
ance with which is basic to any understanding of the field. Later developments are
traced in Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce, 52 HARv. L. REv. 617 (1939) ;
Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes-The Berwind White Case, 53 HARv. L.
REv. 909 (1940); Lockhart, State Tax Barriers to Interstate Trade, 53 HARV. L. REV.
1253 (1940) ; Lockhart, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transportation and Com-
nunication, 57 HARV. L. REsv. 40 (1943): and Powell, More Ado about Gross Receipts
Taxes, 60 HAav. L. Rzv. 501, 710 (1947).
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measure, validity of the subject, and the capacity of the virtues of either to
compensate for the vices of the other. Changes in state tax structures and
in ways of doing business produced insistent doubt as to the congeniality of
these concepts, at least as elaborated and crystallized, with an adequate state
revenue system. Chief Justice Stone pioneered a new approach in his seminal
opinion in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue127 and underscored the
shift in a series of later opinions, notably the much-discussed McGoldrick v.
Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. 1 2  For the remaining period of Stone's
service on the Court, cases regarding state taxation of interstate commerce
were largely recognized as his province. Rutledge, usually in full accord with
Stone in cases arising during their joint tenure,'29 in that period was assigned
the writing of the opinion in only one such case, Nippert v. Richmond."' His
contribution therefore followed Stone's in time as in spirit. Essentially, what
he did was to work out systematically and explicitly the logical corollaries of
Stone's original insights-with a sensitiveness to their import and significance
even beyond that of Stone himself31-and to project their consequences into
a complete new pattern of doctrine independent of, and successor to, the old
"subject-measure" categories.
.Although commerce clause and due process considerations cannot always
be disentangled,' 32 one must from the outset clearly keep in mind the distinc-
tion between them. Interstate activities may conceivably though atypically be
conducted wholly within the limits of one state,"' but characteristically the
situations involve a sequence of activities or an aggregate of dealings partly
local and partly extrastate. The extraterritorial elements relevant to that
branch of due process law having to do with attempted projections of state
jurisdiction and control beyond the borders of the actor state inevitably link
and have a tendency to blur due process and commerce clause notions and
language. The possibility of confusion which, even in regulation cases,' must
127. 303 U. S. 250 (1938).
128. 309 U. S. 33 (1940).
129. Note his joinder in the Stone dissent in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322
U. S. 292 (1944).
130. 327 U. S. 416 (1946). Stone voted with the majority.
131. Rutledge's opinion, annexed as a concurrence to International Harvester Co.
v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340 (1943), but simultaneously serving as a con-
currence to the companion case of General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission. 322
U. S. 335 (1943), and a dissent to the companion case of McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U. S.
335 (1943), forcefully develops and applies the consequences of Stone's premises to a
group of analogous situations; but it would appear that Stone himself concurred in the
reasoning and the distinctions of the majority which are certainly less representative of,
if indeed they are logically reconcilable with, his expressed general position as stated
in other cases.
132. See International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 353
(1944) (concurring opinion).
133. Cf. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (U. S. 1871); Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v.
Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (1908).
134. See, e.g., Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440, 461 (1946).
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be guarded against by precise definition and independent treatment of the due
process issue, has plagued and often beguiled the court in a body of cases of
which the landmark Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansasa"' is perhaps
typical.
His consciousness of the problem sharpened by judicial experience ante-
dating his appointment to the Supreme Court,136 Rutledge insisted on the
proposition that at the threshold the distinction must be kept in view. 137 The
question of a distinguishable local incident was relevant to both constitutional
provisions ; but it was diversely relevant. Absence of one was constitutionally
fatal for due process reasons but its presence sufficed only to reach and not
to settle issues of commerce clause validity. 38 Across how many states so
ever the chain 'of interstate or foreign commerce might wind, each of the
particular links has a local habitation and a name. "9 But whatever their
individual aspects and however they might be particularized, they are still one
135. 216 U. S. 1 (1910).
136. Panitz v. District of Columbia, 122 F.2d 61 (D. C. Cir. 1941), involved a Dis-
trict of Columbia gross receipts tax applied to a Maryland dealer, licensed by the
District but having no District office or resident representative, who supplied his District
customers by mail. The tax was applied to the portion of his gross receipts attributable
to District purchasers but was unapportioned between his business activities carried on
in the District and those carried on in Maryland. Whatever commerce clause contentions
might have been urged against this tax of Congressional derivation were deemed to have
been set at rest by Neild v. District of Columbia, 110 F.2d 246 (D. C. Cir. 1940). Rutledge
addressed himself to the issue of due process propriety, assum:ng the equivalence for the
purpose of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, stating that "The test now controlling
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is whether a tax imposed by
a state bears a reasonable fiscal relation to the opportunities given to the nonresident
business firms by the taxing jurisdiction." Panitz v. District of Columbia, supra at 64.
In the instant case he found that the test was satisfied.
137. See International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 353
(1944) (concurring opinion).
138. It has not yet been decided that every state tax bearing upon or affecting
commerce becomes valid, if only some conceivably or conveniently
separate "local incident" may be found and made the focus of the tax.
This is not to say that the presence of so-called local incidents is irrele-
vant. On the contrary the absence of any connection in fact between the
commerce and the state would be sufficient in itself for striking down the
tax on due process grounds alone: and even substantial connections, in an
economic sense, have been held inadequate to support the local tax. But
beyond the prdsence of a sufficient connection in a due process or
"jurisdictional" sense, whether or not a "local incident" related to or
affecting commerce may be made the subject of state taxation depends
upon other considerations of constitutional policy having reference to the
substantial effects, actual or potential, of the particular tax in suppress-
ilug or burdening unduly the commerce.
Nipper.t v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 423 (1946); Freeman v. Hewitt. 329 U. S.
249, 275 (1946) (concurring opinion); cf. International Harvester Co. v. Department
of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 353 (1944) (concurring opinion).
139. "All interstate commerce takes place within the confines of the states and
necessarily involves 'incidents' occurring within each state through which it passes or
with which it is connected in fact." Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 423 (1946) ; Free-
man v. Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249, 267 (1946) -(concurring opinion) ; cf. International Har-
vester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 357 (1944) (concurring opinion).
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with another components of interstate commerce. The validity of taxation
should not depend upon a state's fortuitous specification of a formal "incident"
which the Court had theretofore approved under other circumstances or its
predictive ingenuity in designating one which might thereafter prove ac-
ceptable. 140  Differentiation among them on the basis that taxation expressly
related to some is "directly on" interstate commerce while, if similarly related
to others, it is "indirect" and bears merely on a "local incident" is spurious or
at best artificial.'4 1 "Interstate commerce as such" is all the "local incidents"
together and it is "local incidents" which in appropriate collocation constitute
interstate commerce as such. Their separation would be as unhealthy for
interstate commerce as the execution of Solomon's judgment would have been
for the infant. Rejection of that classical distinction between "direct" and "in-
direct" incidence of the tax on interstate commerce is therefore required.
The revolutionary consequence of that rejection, however, is that it virtu-
ally eliminates "subject," at least as heretofore understood, as a guide for
deciding the commerce clause constitutionality of state taxation. A secondary
consequence is to deprive "measure" of significance, since "subject" and
"measure" were the poles which determined the lines of force and each
without the other is only an empty word.
A remnant of the law as to "subject" Rutledge did recognize as surviving
in that taxation may not, consistently with the Constitution, discriminate
against interstate commerce142 by "lay[ing] a greater burden on the interstate
business involved than on wholly intrastate business of the same sort"'143 or
140. But to take what is in essence and totality an interstate transaction be-
tween a state of origin and one of market and hang the taxing power of
either state upon some segmented incident of the whole and declare that
this does or does not "tax an interstate transaction" is to do two things.
It is first to ignore that any tax hung on such an incident is levied on an
interstate transaction. For the part cannot be separated from the whole.
It is also to ignore the fact that each state, whether of origin or of
market, has by that one fact alone a relation to the whole transaction so
substantial as to nullify any due process prohibition.
International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 357 (1944).
141. Unless we are to return to the formalism of another day, neither the
"directness" of the incidence of a tax "upon the commerce itself" nor the
fact that its incidence is manipulated to rest upon some "local incident"
of the interstate transaction can be used as a criterion or, many times,
as a consideration of first importance in determining the validity of a
state tax bearing upon or affecting interstate commerce. Not the words
"direct" and "indirect" or "local incident" can fulfill the function of
judgment in deciding whether the tax brings the forbidden results.
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 269 (1946).
142. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 425 (1946) ; International Harvester Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 358 (1944) ; cf. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v.
Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 668 (1949); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. -v. Board of Railroad
Comm'rs, 332 U. S. 495, 501 (1947) ; Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 264 (1946).
143. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury. 322 U. S. 340, 351
(1944).
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"segregat[ing] the interstate transaction for separate or special treatment."' 44
It was not verbal distinction or nominal assimilation that Rutledge had in mind
but the probabilities attending the operation in fact of the tax. 4 ' Thus, the
ultimate vice of the flat rate "drummers' tax" disapproved in Nippert v.
Richniond was that its lack of proportioning to the volume of business done,
its location as a financial and psychological hurdle met not only before any
business could be done but normally before it could even be estimated how
much might be done, its imposition on a way of transacting business mostly
resorted to by those whose sales were characteristically scattered, occasional,
and small, combined to render it a type of tax peculiarly selective against and
eminently discouraging to interstate dealers-a vice not eradicated by treating
alike non-Virginians and all Virginians not established in Richmond. It
discriminated-that is, created business charges which were likely to apply
with peculiar frequency to interstate dealings and to few if any intrastate
dealings-and it was bad because it discriminated."'
Yet out-and-out discrimination was only a small province of the vast em-
pire where "subject" and "measure" had reigned; and the task remained, once
they were deposed, of establishing a new authority comparably comprehensive.
As has been stated, Rutledge relied for that purpose on the consequences de-
riving from certain suggestions of Stone, by the latter most succinctly phrased
perhaps in his recognition of "opposing demands that the commerce shall bear
its share of local taxation, and that it shall not, on the other hand, be sub-
jected to multiple tax burdens merely because it is interstate commerce." 147
What interstate commerce could claim and all that it could claim under the
commerce clause with reference to state taxation was to share the common
lot.14s Neither special privileges nor special perils were to attend it.
Elimination of privilege was easy. It flows almost automatically from
discard of the law "subject" with its carving up into "local incidents" and its
chimerical category of particulars where the tax was deemed to be imposed
directly "on commerce itself." Granted that the enterprise or activity taxed
144. Ibid; see Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 276 (1946).
145. It is no answer ... that the tax is neither prohibitive nor discriminatory
on the face of the ordinance; or that it applies to all local distributors
doing business as appellant has done. . . To ignore the variations in
effect which follow from application of the tax, uniform on the face of
the ordinance, to highly different fact situations is only to ignore those
practical consequences. In that blindness lies the vice of the tax.
Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 431 (1946).
146. Although the difference in tax load may not be sufficient actually to
block or impede the free flow of interstate trade, discrimination alone,
without regard to showing of further consequences, has been held con-
sistently to be sufficient for outlawing the tax.
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 277 (1946).
147. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 259 (1938)
148. Cf. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 276 (1946).
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had sufficient factual links with the taxing jurisdiction to make it appropriate
on due process grounds that it should contribute to that jurisdiction's upkeep,
the designation of the particular aspect of it which should be the occasion for
the tax (whatever its consequences for purposes of statutory construction and
smooth tax administration) was immaterial to the issue of constitutional
power. Yet, there was the ever-present limitation that the matter desig-
nated not cast special risks on interstate commerce because of its being
interstate commerce. 4 ' Indeed, those enterprises which were neither seek-
ing nor doing any local business so that under the older law of subject
and measure they would have offered no tax handhold for the state 5 ' were
no longer free commoners but must bear a share of the state's tax burden.'
Elimination of perils was harder. Something is accomplished by dis-
allowance of discriminatory taxation but it is no guaranty against the piling of
peculiar risks on interstate enterprise or activity that a particular tax treats
it like all similar enterprises or activities within a given state. That is true
because characteristically interstate commerce does not transpire within a
given state and its peregrinations expose it to multiple risks where home-
staying commerce which is like in kind encounters but a single risk.' 12
"The long history of this problem boils down in general statement to the
formula that the states, by virtue of the force of the commerce clause, may not
unduly burden interstate commerce."' 1 3  ". . . Not all burdens upon com-
merce but only undue or discriminatory ones are forbidden. ' 15 4  ". . . In-
creasingly with the years emphasis has been placed upon practical conse-
quences and effects, either actual or threatened, of questioned legislation to
block or impede interstate commerce or place it at a practical disadvantage with
the local trade."'5 2  "Validity of such a tax . . . should be determined
by . . . whether those forbidden consequences would be produced, either
through the actual incidence of multiple taxes laid by different states or by
the threat of them, with resulting uncertainties producing the same impeding
consequences."' 56 To save a tax against commerce clause objections, it must,
149. See International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 352
(1944).
150. See, e.g., Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555 (1925).
151. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662 (1949).
152. . . . [Tihe state may not impose certain taxes on interstate commerce.
its incidents or instrumentalities, which are no more in amount or
burden than it places on its local business, not because this of itself is
discriminatory, cumulative or special or would violate due process, but
because other states also may have the right constitutionally, apart from
the commerce clause, to tax the same thing and either the actuality or
the risk of their doing so makes the total burden cumulative, discrimina-
tory or special.
International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 358 (1944).
153. Ibid.
154. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 425 (1946).
155. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 270 (1946).
156. Id. at 274.
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therefore, be so framed as to be both non-discriminatory and defensible against
the charge that under the circumstances it imposes on interstate commerce a
grave hazard of cumulative tax demands placing it at a competitive disadvan-
tage (which may, indeed, be regarded as one special form of discrimination) .157
Statutes which aim only at state participation along with other states in
a fair division in taxable values of interstate enterprises or transactions to
which they jointly contribute and those addressed to activities so uniquely
localized within state borders that no other state could press a claim with
reference to them contain inherent safeguards against cumulation which make
out for them a prima facie case of commerce clause validity.
The former comprise the apportioned taxes. Rutledge inclined to find in
apportionment a sufficient answer to assertions of commerce clause invalid-
ity' " and deemed its presence a suf ficient reason to concur in sustaining the tax
involved in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone"9 and, pro tanto, that in Central
Grcvhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey '6 and its absence a controlling reason for in-
validating that involved in Freeman v. Hewit.161 The states "have considerable
latitude in the selection of fair methods of making apportionment '162 and he
was agreeable to sustaining exactions proportioned fractionally to relevant busi-
ness data, such as comparative mileage travelled within the state," 3 or capital
used or invested within the state,'1 64 or provisions crediting arrangements abat-
ing the state's demand pari passu with the assertion of tax claims by other states
having adequate relations to the transaction. 65 One may perhaps surmise that
Rutledge recognized the possibility and even probability that variant schemes
157. "The cumulative tax burden is in effect discrimlnatory, involving in any prac-
tical view the exact effects of a single discriminatory tax." Id. at 277.
158. Apportionment in itself prevents taxation of extrastate "events" or
portions of the business done, unless the apportionment is itself con-
stitutionally invalid as not reflecting a sufficient approximation to what
the state may be entitled, on the facts, to tax.
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 97 n.5 (1948) ; cf. International
Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416, 423 (1947) (concurring opinion) ; International
Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 360 (1944) ; Panitz v. District
of Columbia, 122 F.2d 61 (D. C. Cir. 1941).
159. 335 U. S. 80, 96 (1948).
160. 334 U. S. 653 (1948). Rutledge noted only concurrence in the result, without
opinion; but his later references to the case in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335
U. S. 80, 97 (1948), and Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 667 (1949),
indicate the ground of his concurrence.
161. 329 U. S. 249, 259 (1946).
162. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 97 n.7 (1948).
163. See Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653 (1948).
164. See Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80 (1948).
165. See International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 359
(1944). This opinion, serving as a concurrence not only for the case to which it is
annexed but also for General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U. S. 335 (1944),
notes that the Iowa statute there involved allowed credits against the Iowa use tax for
sales taxes paid elsewhere and finds in that circumstance an ample support for the tax.
Cf. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 280 and n.42 (1946).
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of apportionment adopted by the several states would bear unevenly on inter-
state enterprises with the aggregate tax liability of some somewhat increased
and that of others somewhat reduced in comparison with what would result
were all tax structures uniform. He nevertheless felt that, with sheerly dis-
criminatory taxes outlawed, the balance of gain or loss would be so difficult to
project and so likely to average out, when applied to the varying particulars of
the group of interstate enterprises and of state laws, as to quench any incentive
a state might have to rig its apportionment. With undue burden the cri-
terion,6  accidental discrepancies of small magnitude would hardly be fatal
although occasioned by the multistate range of the taxpayer's activity.
Of equivalent force in rebutting the threat and avoiding the invalidating
consequences of multiplied exactions from interstate commerce is the element
of exclusive control alluded to by Stone in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Revenue in his observation that
The tax is not one which in form or substance can be repeated by
other states in such manner as to lay an added burden on the inter-
state distribution of the magazine . . All the events upon which
the tax is conditioned . . . occur in New Mexico and not elsewhere.
All are beyond any control and taxing power which, without the
commerce clause, those states could exert through its dominion over
the distribution of the magazine or its subscribers.167
The principle was approved and applied by Rutledge in his opinion in Inter-
state Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone,65 where a "privilege tax" measured by the
taxpayer's gross revenues from transportation, all regarded for purposes of
decision as being from interstate commerce,' was sustained over commerce
clause objections despite lack of apportionment. The case presented one of
those exceptional situations where the taxpayer's plant and activities were
wholly within the state although devoted wholly to interstate commerce. Yet
in two other opinions where logically he might have generalized the notion
into a unifying principle, Rutledge failed to do so and rested his reasoning on
traditional patterns of special doctrine. In Independent W'arehouses, Inc. v.
Scheele"' a tax equivalent to, although in form not one on property in transit
was sustained on the classical distinction between interruptions for transporta-
tion convenience and stoppage for an independent local advantage; exercise of
the privilege of warehousing in transit was deemed under the circumstances
166. See notes 154, 152 supra.
167. 303 U. S. 250, 260 (1938).
168. 337 U. S. 662 (1949) ; cf. dissenting opinions by Stone in Northwest Airlines
v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292 (1944), and of Douglas in Joseph v. Carter & Weekes
Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422 (1947), in both of which Rutledge joined.
169. Burton's separate concurrence, Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U. S.
668-669 (1949), was based on the analysis that the transportation was in intra-state com-
merce.
170. 331 U. S. 70 (1947).
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE-A SYMPOSIUM
of the case an instance of the latter.'7 ' In Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v.
Board of Railroad Commissioners1 72 a brace of flat rate privilege taxes, de-
manded in addition to uncontested gasoline taxes and motor vehicle license
fees, were applied to a motor carrier for hire whose highway user in Montana
was altogether for interstate business. The taxes were sustained by the
orthodox recognition of public interests of substance crystallized in language
of "privilege of using the highway." Especially after his critical re-examina-
tion of the predicates of settled doctrine in Nippert v. Richmond, his silence as
to the unique taxing potential of New Je.rsey over New Jersey warehousing
and of Montana for furnishing Montana highways-more, indeed, his failure
to explore the implications of the exclusive control principle as a comprehensive
concept uniting the "independent-local-advantage" and the "privilege-of-using-
the-highway" cases, together with many others-is puzzling. No doubt a lax
development of the principle might result in slipping back to the test of "local
incident" and all the law of "subject" and "measure"; but surely discrimination
in application could avoid that danger. Ordinarily, although not necessarily,
173
the idea would seem applicable to transportation rather than to trade; gener-
ally, and perhaps always, it seems relevant when the tax follows from
individual activity within the unilateral competence of a single actor as
contrasted with transactions, which presuppose dealings of two or more. But
Rutledge did not explore the matter and this is not the place to do so. He
did recognize the principle; and he did dispose of cases in a manner uni-
formly consistent with it though assigning more traditional grounds.
Without vitiating discrimination or curative apportionment or uniqueness
of relationship, the problem of extracting replacement for the local-incident,
subject-and-measure analysis from the "undue burden" criterion was posed in
naked simplicity in cases of taxes upon a transfer of property by sale between
states-variously styled "use" or "sales," "gross income" or "gross receipts"
taxes. Due process wise, both the state of origin and the state of market had
an interest adequate to sustain the tax. 7 4  Laying out of consideration the
contingency of taxation by an intermediate or other third state (a matter
which Rutledge never had occasion to consider systematically),'71 the poten-
tiality of a second tax and hence the threat of an added burden on interstate
171. Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1 (1933), was relied upon as furnishing "the
governing principles." See Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U. S. 70, 72
(1947).
172. 332 U. S. 495 (1947).
173. See, e.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938).
174. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 356
(1944); ef. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 271-272 (1946).
175. See his express reservation of consideration of a hypothetical Illinois use tax
on the Indiana sales falling under Class D in International Harvester Co. v. Department
of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 362 (1944).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
commerce because it is interstate is implicit in the situation.1 7 6  The Court's
initial decision to immunize such transactions, from start to finish, from state
taxation even though tax multiplicity was not present but merely possible had
the unhealthy result of discrimination against intrastate commerce, by totally
relieving interstate dealings from tax costs paralleling those that equivalent
intrastate business bore, and could not endure. 7 7 At the opposite extreme is
the proposition, with some scattered judicial support 78 but never accepted as
a basis for decision, that it was for Congress, rather than the Court, to provide
any corrective and that even actual overlapping state taxes on interstate deal-
ings should be sustained all the way round until and unless Congress acted.
This suggestion Rutledge found inadmissible, not only because it would uproot
too large a body of decisions requiring apportionment and indeed would
seem to sanction taxes blatantly discriminating against interstate commerce
but on more theoretical considerations as to the constitutiona force of the
negative implications of the commerce clauseY7
A middle ground must be found.
Where the cumulative effect of two taxes, by whatever name
called, one imposed by the state of origin, the other by the state of
market, actually bears in practical effect upon such an interstate
transaction, there is no escape under the doctrine of undue burden
from one of two possible alternatives. Either one tax must fall, or
what -is the same thing, be required to give way to the other . . . or
there must be apportionment.8 "
It may be that the mere risk of double taxation would not have
the same consequences, given always of course a sufficient due
process connection with the taxing states, that actual double taxation
has, or rhay have, for application of the commerce clause prohi-
bition. Risk of course is not irrelevant to burden or to the clogging
effect the rule against undue burden is intended to prevent.'
While
the bare unexercised power of another state does not produce . . .
the invidious sort of barrier or impediment the commerce clause was
designed to stop [but] only opens the way for them to be produced.
This danger is not fanciful but real, more especially in a time when
new sources of revenue constantly are being sought [and] accord-
ingly . . . this door should not be opened.' 8'
176. Id. at 360.
177. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 275-276 (1946).
178. See Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 435 (1946) (dissenting opinion of
Douglas joined by Murphy) ; McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U. S.
176, 183 (1940) (Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas dissenting).
179. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 279; cf. International Harvester Co. v. De-
partment of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 360 (1944).
180. Ibid.
181. Id. at 361-362.
182. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 277 (1946). This statement is rather freely
rearranged in punctuation and sequence of phrases without, it is believed, doing violence
to its content.
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Arguably, either state might be permitted to tax unless the tax policy of
the other interested state demonstrated the actual presence, or a grave threat,
of cumulation with no significance attaching to the mere potentiality of
cumulation."8 3 But "to require factual determination of forbidden effects
in each case would be to invite costly litigation, make decision turn in some
cases, perhaps many, on doubtful facts or conclusions, and encourage the
enactment of legislation involving those consequences,"'8 4 so that practicalities
of tax and of judicial administration are better served by a policy applying
alike to situations of actual and contingent multiple taxes.
With the coup de grace given to the notions that neither state may in any
event tax and that both may until Congress acts, and with dismissal of the
suggestion that the fact of cumulative burden or a genuine threat of it is
material, all that survives are the proposition that one and only one state may
tax and the problem of selecting the one so privileged (saving always, of
course, the mitigating effects of apportionment or crediting). To the
proposition, Rutledge reluctantly8 5 assented; and he indicated a leaning
toward "vest[ing] the power to tax in the state of the market, subject to
power in the forwarding state also to tax by allowing credit to the full amount
of any tax paid or due at the destination."'8 8 However, he was not finally and
firmly committed to that choice. 17  There remain unsolved peripheral prob-
183. Cf. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 360-
362 (1944), in connection with the portion of the opinion representing a dissent to McLeod
v. Dilworth, 322 U. S. 327 (1944).
184. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 279 (1946).
185. To deprive either state, whether of origin or of market, of the power
to lay the tax, permitting the other to do so, has the vice of allowing one
state to tax but denying this power to the other when neither may be
as much affected by the deprivation as would be the one allowed to tax
and, in any event, both may have equal or substantial due process con-
nections with the transaction.
Id. at 278.
186. Id. at 279; see International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S.
340, 361 (1944):
. . . in my opinion the choice should lie in favor of the state of
market rather than the state of origin. The former is the state where
the goods must come in competition with those sold locally. It is the one
where the burden of the tax necessarily will fall equally on both classes
of trade. To choose the tax of the state of origin presents at least some
possibilities that the burden it imposes on its local trade, with which the
interstate traffic does not compete, at any rate directly, will be heavier
than that placed by the consuming state on its local business of the same
character. If therefore choice has to be made, whether as a matter of
exclusive power to tax or one of allowing credit, it should be in favor
of the state of market or consumption as the one most certain to place
the same tax load on both the interstate and competing local business.
187. In discussing Freeman v. Hewit with him, I questioned the preference for the
state of market and suggested the superior interests of the state of origin, on the various
grounds that its resources of materials and labor were incorporated in the commodity
and often depleted to the extent of the transfer, that the tendency of the preference was
to a further colonialization of producing regions of the country for the benefit of those
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lems of adjustment in case of apportioned taxes'88 but the substitute for the
old law of "local incidents" and "subject-measure" was formulated in all
the essentials.
Discrimination, safeguarding by apportionment or exclusiveness of con-
trol, selection of a preferred state where more than one had adequate due
process connections-these were the relevant subjects of inquiry. Special
formulae once useful to harmonize results became vestigial and could be dis-
pensed with-for example: taxation "measured by" elements immune as
"subjects"' 8 9 and "in lieu"-ness.19' The test was undue burden. The parti-
cular verbalizations which the states happened to use in framing their tax
statutes could be de-emphasized and choices among the swarm of "incidents"
4dequate for due process purposes were no longer constitutionally significant,
so that "sales," "use," "gross income" taxes were all one for commerce clause
purposes.' 9' The test was undue burden. Flat rate taxes not scaled to the
volume of business were objectionable if applied under such circumstances
as to place interstate activities at a relative disadvantage' 9 ' but were not invalid
per se if unattended by such a consequence. The test was undue burden. 9'
Rutledge's fundamental premise was that state taxation of interstate
commerce is an aspect of regulation of interstate commerce; his ultimate goal
(to which the concept of undue burden led) was its re-integration into that
larger pattern. With the multiplication of precedents and the refinement of
doctrine, the relationship had become not so much disavowed as disregarded.
The impact of his opinions is to break down the compartmentalization, to rid
the law of commerce taxation of its quirks and realign it with the law of com-
already favored historically by previous accumulation of capital (to an appreciable
extent as a result of the Court's own prior decisions), and that the tax resources of the
producing states were on balance apt to be more limited in quantity and variety than
those of states of market. His answer was that the problem merited further consideration
but that the preference expressed did not represent a holding and that the Court had
not had the benefit of argument as to which state should be given the green light, a
matter which could be definitely decided when it should be presented for decision.
188. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 282 n.44 (1946).
189. Id. at 269.
190. Ibid.; cf. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 667 n.7 (1949).
191. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 424 (1946) ; International Harvester Co.
v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 349 (1944) (concurring and dissenting
opinion) ; cf. Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U. S. 70, 85 (1947) (equating
property taxes on goods stored and a franchise tax on the storage). But cf. Aero
Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm'rs, 332 U. S. 495, 504-505 (1947)
(recognizing the distinction between taxes on "the privilege of doing business" and those
on "the privilege of using the highways" while cautioning against confusing "a tax for the
privilege of using the highways with one the proceeds of which are necessarily devoted
to maintaining them.").
192. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946).
193. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm'rs, 332 U. S. 495
(1947).
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merce regulation.. 4  References to the assumed "purpose of the commerce
clause," the consideration impelling its adoption, to free national trade from
state restrictions and barriers abound in his tax opinions. 5 The Cooley case
is vouched in support of continuing state authority to tax even though the
subject trenched upon is interstate commerce ;"' the doctrine that the com-
merce clause of itself imposes limitations upon state authority, with an ac-
count of that doctrine's judicial development in regulation cases, is set forth
in explanation of the source of constitutional limitations on state taxing
power ;207 the rejection of the "exclusiveness of the power" approach pro-
posed by Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden00 is adduced to show that interstate
commerce is not a general sanctuary against state taxation.0 0 Once more
approached as simply one phase of commerce regulation, the attitudes and
ideas generically applicable become specifically relevant in tax cases. Thus,
implementation of taxation by the technique of licensing could not be pro-
tested by even a purely interstate commerce operator, if the tax was otherwise
valid, 200 any more than could licensing in connection with other regulation.
2 0
'
Congressional statutes were not to be read as having so pervasively occupied
the field as to exclude the states by inference from taxation,20 2 an illustration
of the proposition that corollary state and federal regulations were to be so
interpreted as to give to each the maximum capacity for operation.20 3  Con-
gress, by express acquiescence, could permit the states to apply to interstate
commerce programs of taxation which, had Congress remained silent, would
have been cut down because of the negative implications from the commerce
clause, and this even to the extent of discriminating against interstate com-
merce.21 4  The broad concern with the practical operation and effects of
legislation,25 the distaste for separating and segregating the components of
transactions, 20 the penchant for an affirmative and positive approach, more
194. Their separate identities are completely merged by him at times as in the
entire discussion in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (1946), and in
the footnote references used for supporting authority in A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH.
195. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 263-264 (1946); Memphis Natural
Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 98 (1948).
196. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 266 (1946).
197. Id. at 263; Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 418 (1946).
198. 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824).
199. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 261-262 (1946).
200. Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U. S. 70, 86 (1947).
201. See note 84 supra.
202. See Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U. S. 70, 85 (1947) (Inter-
state Commerce Act) ; cf. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm'rs,
332 U. S. 495, 503 (1947) (federal aid to build highways).
203. See notes 98, 118 supra.
204. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (1946).
205. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 270 (1946) ; Nippert v. Richmond,
327 U. S. 416, 432 (1946).
206. See, e.g., Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 423 (1946).
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sensitive to the permissive than to the prohibitory possibilities of the commerce
clause,2 7 faithfully reproduce, in tax cases, features observed as characteris-
tic of his thinking about both Congressional and state regulation of inter-
state commerce.
As to the quality and validity of his contribution to the law of interstate
commerce, this report has undertaken to furnish the data for judgment ;2_,1
evaluation must remain largely a personal matter conditioned upon the
reader's prepossessions and private premises. Yet some conclusions may
properly be ventured.
Without being strictly original, Rutledge's work in the field was vastly
creative and perceptive; he understood the consequences of and the relation-
ships between notions previously thrown out by others, notably Stone, and
organized them into a viable body of doctrine to succeed one obsolescent,
cumbersome, and dubiously serviceable. His expressed views are conspicuous
for their internal consistency in respect both of logic and of policy; his restora-
tion of taxation to the universe of commerce regulation, his placing them upon
a platform of principles common not only to both but to Congressional regula-
tion as well, and indeed to the interpretation of relevant statutes, are notable.
Those whose taste is for nice distinctions and theoretical refinements no
doubt will think his approach too blunt and undiscriminating. It is clear that
Rutledge's way of understanding the Constitution was in the spirit of equity
rather than of the strict law. Some loss of precision there is. A resulting
increased possibility for error there is if application devolves upon mediocre
judges who need fixed mechanical dogmas, but there is the compensating
possibility for continuous adaptation of the constitutional scheme to changes
in American life, at the hands of great and sensitive justices. Those whose
interests or whose temperaments persuade them to a restrittive and negative
view of the functions of government will be in fundamental disagreement
with his reading of the clause primarily to find permissions and not limitations;
but here we leave the realm of reason for that of emotion and comment on
an intellectual plane would be futile. It may, I think, justly be objected that
his recurrent argument from the original purpose and function of the com-
merce clause accords better with juristic folklore than with history ;209 but the
argument was not after all central to his position. As one who thought, like
Holmes, that "continuity with the past is only a necessity, not a duty,"210 he
207. See, e.g., Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 96 (1948).
208. Quotations have been utilized somewhat more freely than is customary in both
the text and the footnotes as a means of imparting familiarity with the very tone and
texture of Rutledge's thinking.
209. Abel, Commerce Regulations Before Gibbons v. Ogden: Trade and Traffic,
14 BROOKLYN L. REv. 215, 243 (1948).
210. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 211
(1920).
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would have felt that the necessity, and so the relevance, of history, whatever its
content, must yield to the more urgent necessities of social ordering in the
present and foreseeable future created by emerging industrial and institutional
phenomena of which he was powerfully, almost painfully, conscious:
211
What are the prospects that his opinions will abidingly influence com-
merce clause thinking? Put otherwise, how far are they "the law ?" In his
life time, his thinking outran the positions to which the Court had advanced
so that, while he wrote regulation of commerce and even, where nothi'ng
much hinged on major premises, tax opinions for the Court, his penetrating
expositions in the critical International Harvester and Freenuin cases were
individual concurrences in which none of his associates joined. Near the
very end, in Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, he had won three of his
associates2 12 to agreement to an opinion whose essential premises were those
of International Harvester and Freeman; but the concurrence of Burton,
grounded on quite alien and in fact opposing reasoning, was required for the
affirmance. Thus for most of his judicial service his views were individual
and he never did procure their adoption by a majority. Nor is there any sign
in the opinions of the past term that they have won converts. Federal Power
Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co.,21 3 while not irreconcilable, seems out of
harmony with the Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line case; and the discussion in
the one case on state taxation, Capitol Greyhound, Lines v. Brice,214 is chan-
neled in terms of specialized precedents which obviate any consideration of
basic postulates. The longer future may tell another story. Rutledge was
fond of observing and commenting on the drift of decision.21 5 He was as
well both deliberately attentive and uncommonly sensitive to the direction
and particularities of change in the institutional framework of American life,
accommodation to which is the condition of survival of constitutional doctrine
in common with other intellectual constructs. 'If, like the House of Lords,
the Supreme Court has only a suspensive veto with the postponed decision
finally made elsewhere and if, as is very possible, Rutledge appraised ac-
curately the developing pattern of relationships between our political and'our
economic and social institutions, we have, in his opinions, the commerce clause
law of tomorrow or the day after. Should that be true, let his opinions
then be remembered as prophetic of what the law was to become.
211. See Rutledge, Book Review, 28 IOWA L. REV. 174, 176 (1942).
212. Black, Douglas, and Murphy.
213. 70 Sup. Ct. 266 (1950).
214. 70 Sup. Ct. 806 (1950).
215. See, e.g., Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 420 (1946);
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 272-273 (1946).
